An intellectual property right is an exclusive right. Justification of this proposition involves more than one theory. In the case of a patent right, typical theories involved may well include the theory of incentives for creation and the theory of compensation for public opening. 2 The former theory contends that denying an exclusive right to the creator of an invention that is a physically unseizable and intangible entity would give rise to the possibility of a third party getting a "free ride" and would thereby diminish the incentive to create. Therefore, an exclusive right is granted to the creator so that she can preclude any third party's unauthorized use of her invention and thus personally make exclusive use of it. The latter theory asserts that an exclusive right is granted to the inventor as compensation for opening her invention to the public. In both cases, it is expected that a patent right plays a major part in enabling exclusive use of an invention by virtue of its exclusivity. In the case of copyright, some people rely on the so-called theory of ownership based on mental labor, which says that ownership of a sort should be recognized for a product of mental labor, just as ownership over a tangible entity that is the product of physical labor is recognized. 3 Naturally, this theory is premised on the exclusivity of such ownership. , 1975] , p. 63). As far as patent rights, at least, are concerned, the argument based on natural law appears to have become irrelevant. The argument based on compensation from monopoly is different from that based on profit incentive from monopoly in that the former takes the grant of a patent as a just compensation for the inventor while the latter positions it as an incentive rather than fair compensation (Machlup, id, at 69), although these two arguments these days are not so clearly differentiated. 3 Masao Handa, "Overview of the Copyright Law," 14th edition, (Hougakushoin, 2009) raised by open innovation in relation to the intellectual property system will be identified.
Given that discussions about open innovation are mainly focused on technological innovation, what follows will be centered on the patent system, which is specifically designed to protect technological ideas, as opposed to other rights under the intellectual property system.
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Essential Characteristics of Open Innovation (1) Definition
Open innovation is a concept put forward by Chesbrough et al. in a number of books. 4 Chesbrough defined open innovation as follows: "Open innovation is a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology" 5 ; "Open innovation means that companies should make much greater use of external ideas and technologies in their own business, while letting their unused ideas be used by other companies" 6 ; and "Open innovation is the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively." 7 These definitions all allude to the internal use of external ideas, the external use of unused internal ideas, and an innovation strategy as envisaged from the viewpoint of the firms.
This gives rise to the question of how open innovation was put forward and what
its specific features are. In the following section, these questions will be discussed in a systematic manner, using examples mainly taken from Chesbrough's writings. Closed innovation is a self-contained model in which a series of processes from research and development to product sales is vertically integrated within an organization. In such a model, research and development activities are subject to economics of scale, with the central research laboratory playing an important role.
In recent years, however, the environment surrounding innovation has changed.
On the one hand, rising technology development costs, shortened product life cycles and an outflow of firms' human resources has reduced the effectiveness of closed innovation, while on the other, the growing efforts of intermediary agents, including venture capitalists, along with start-up companies and universities to identify external partners have been setting the stage for the realization of open innovation.
It has long been hinted that closed innovation centered on a firm's own central research laboratory has its limits, as symbolized by the phrase "the end of an era of central research laboratories," 8 which Chesbrough used to describe the end of the monopoly on knowledge. In the U.S. in 1981, seventy percent of all research and development spending was by large companies with 25,000 or more employees. This share decreased to forty percent in 2001. 9 The leading role that the central research laboratory of large companies played in research and development has diminished.
Given such a trend, firms seeking innovation should promote the division of innovation labor based on the premise that good ideas are available outside the company. Open innovation is an approach that could just meet the needs of this situation. On the other hand, the inside-out pattern of knowledge flow is premised on an internal reservoir of unused technologies which Chesbrough attributed to a tension between a firm's research department and engineering department and/or a lack of communication between them. Traditionally, research departments have encouraged independent and original research without regard to commercial viability, and the measure of success is whether or not the research results in a patent and/or paper.
Once the research has resulted in a patent and/or paper, the research is regarded as complete, and the department's limited budget is allocated to some other new area of research. On the other hand, engineering departments determine the effectiveness of research based on its commercial viability or market potential, rather than its originality. This incongruence leads to an accumulation of ideas "on the shelf" between the research and engineering departments. The inside-out pattern of knowledge flow is intended to make external use of these unused ideas.
Even though open innovation places more importance on the effective use of external knowledge, it does not eliminate the need for an internal R&D department. Instead, under the open innovation paradigm, an internal R&D department is required to have the ability to "identify the quality" of external knowledge and the ability to absorb and promote greater use of it, in addition to the ability to create knowledge. Therefore, the role of an internal R&D department is redefined as moving beyond the bounds of mere knowledge creation to the integration of internal and external knowledge.
(ii) Business Model
Chesbrough emphasizes the importance of a business model. He says that it is meaningless to discuss the value of an idea or a technology in and of itself. Much more important is a business model, or put differently, a framework in which the potential value of an idea or a technology is transformed into an economic value. In contrast with closed innovation, the business model of the focal firm and that of other players are mutually dependent. Therefore, the focal firm is required to perform new functions of (i) positioning itself inside the value network, (ii) making positive efforts to manage its relationship with outside players, and (iii) reconciling any tension between these players that may arise from or in connection with the distribution of captured value. 15 Points to consider include the fact that, along with the increase in the number of transferred patents, the number of registered patents itself is on the increase. And the rising percentage of deals between affiliated companies cited as the reason for transfer should also be taken into account. Admitting this point, Chesbrough states that attention should be given to a growing percentage of transfers conducted for the cited reason of securitization, which is occurring parallel. For the ratio of the number of transferred patents to that of registered patents, Chesbrough"s subsequent research report shows that the ratio of the number of patents transferred at least once to that of patents registered in the relevant year has remained at approx. 25% (Henry Chesbrough, "Emerging Secondary Markets for Intellectual Property: US and Japan Comparisons," p. 59 [March 31, 2006] (http://www.ryutu.inpit.go.jp/pldb/download/download/H17esm-j.pdf). Chesbrough indicates that although this figure of 25% has not changed over time, the figure itself is substantial enough (id, at 59). The research report also covered the trends in Japan, wherein it is interesting to note that, out of the total number of patents transferred, the percentage of patents transferred for reasons other than a change in name and/or address or merger by the owner increased from slightly over 20% in 1997 to slightly over 30% in 2005 (id, at 84). 
Relationship between Open Innovation and the Intellectual Property System
In the exordium of this paper, the author referred to the suggestion that open innovation was incompatible with the intellectual property system, which is intended to create an exclusive right to protect intellectual creations, and could thereby render it insignificant.
However, in actual fact, in no way does open innovation deny or make obsolete the intellectual property system. The rationale for this may be obvious from the points contained in Section 2, which will here be expanded upon. In cases where an intellectual property such as a patent is traded for value, an essential prerequisite for the deal is that a patent right has been created as a tradable property right and that a trading rule applicable to the deal has been established under the framework of the Patent Law. This latter point will be discussed in more detail later. In that sense, it is safe to say that open innovation cannot exist without the intellectual property system. inventions by reducing costs involved therein. 27 In the light of this facilitatory effect of the patent system, an issue arises as to whether or not the rules and scheme 27 Ryo Shimanami, on page one of his article "Scope of Exclusivity of Patent Right" published in the Annual Report of Japan Association of Industrial Property Law No. 33, says that although use of a contract would allow for the trading of an invention without the patent system, in the absence of the patent system the first question that emerges is how do the parties concerned identify inventions that they may wish to use. Apart from this question, it is easily conceivable that the parties concerned would have to spend a tremendous amount of money in defining the scope of the subject invention and the mode of utilization thereof. In contrast, the patent system requires an applicant to define the scope of claims and published the same (though on a voluntary basis) beforehand, which markedly reduces costs involved in the proposed transaction. It can therefore be assumed that the patent system has the effect of reducing costs involved in the trading of inventions and hence of facilitating such trade. 
(2) Specific Examples of Policy Issues
In light of the issues discussed in the preceding subsection, although not exhaustive, the following is offered as a list of some of the specific policy issues to be considered:
(i) Activation of the Market for Intellectual Property
As discussed earlier, more active trading in intellectual property is expected to take place under open innovation, and therefore, activation of the market for intellectual property surfaces as a challenge.
Beyond doubt, under the transaction cost theory discussed earlier, the existence of the patent system has the effect of facilitating trade in intellectual property. And, under the patent system that lays down the rules for the creation and utilization of a patent right, it relies on the negotiating parties to decide whether the right holder himself will make use of his invention or have another person do so through licensing, which naturally is premised on the existence of the market for intellectual
property. This, however, does not mean that patents are actually being actively traded within such a market.
Looking at the current situation in the Japanese patent market, it is hard to make the case that the market is booming. As is well known, only 50% of the total number of patents owned by firms are actually utilized, with the remaining half never even utilized by the owner, not to mention traded on the market. Finally, the possibility of allowing an unregistered license to become effective against a third party is under consideration. 33 Admittedly, this institutional arrangement, by securing a certain level of stability, will help stimulate the trade in inventions.
Also under consideration is the licensing of right system. 34 It is understood that, under the licensing of right system, a patentee registers her willingness to license her patent on a voluntary basis, and, in return for this, is entitled to a reduction or exemption of the annual patent fee. This arrangement is also assumed to be intended to promote licensing by reducing transaction costs involved in concluding a license contract.
Be that as it may, it is uncertain whether or not these measures can solve major issues such as the difficulty in evaluating the value of an invention and high transaction costs.
In addition to the measures mentioned above, it is proposed to require disclosure of the terms and conditions of a transfer contract or license contract with respect to a patent as a strategy for reducing transaction costs. 35 The idea underlying this proposal is that the principle by which the disclosure of data on home sales greatly benefited the real estate market would hold true in the patent market. In anticipation of criticism of the proposal, some proponents argue that requiring every player in In contrast, in Japan, it still remains unclear whether the issue of patent trolls really exists or not, and the ongoing process of reviewing the patent system involves arguments for and against limiting the right to demand an injunction. under open innovation.
It was stated earlier that if a business model in which a right holder does not use his own invention exclusively prevails then the necessity or validity of granting an exclusive right for intellectual creations may be challenged. At the moment, however, a business model in which a right holder does not exclusively use his invention does not yet prevail. The transaction cost theory suggests that the creation of an exclusive property right would also have a promotional effect on the trading in inventions under open innovation. Consequently, it would not be necessary, at this time, to walk away from the principles underlying the patent protection framework based on the idea of exclusive rights or the right to injunctive relief. Given that it is unnecessary to regard the exclusive-right or injunctive-relief framework of intellectual property protection as an absolute essential, 42 however, it is suggested that the focus of discussion should be shifted from whether to limit the right to injunctive relief to in what circumstances such right should be limited, whether such question should be clarified beforehand as legislation or be decided upon by the courts on a case-by-case basis, 43 and what would be the appropriate amount of compensation for damages in cases where the right to injunctive relief is limited.
(iii) Licensing with regard to Jointly Owned Patents Awareness of the need to design neutral industrial arrangements with respect to the specific form of an invention directs our attention to an issue concerning jointly owned patent licensing, which requires each of the joint owners to obtain the consent of the other joint owners.
It is expected that the spread of open innovation, with its emphasis on the integration of internal and external knowledge, will naturally result in an increase in the number of jointly owned patents. The Japanese Patent Law stipulates in Article 73, paragraph 2 that where a patent right is jointly owned, unless otherwise agreed upon by contract, each of the joint owners may practice the patented invention without the consent of the other joint owners. At the same time, the law stipulates in paragraph 3 of the same Article that where a patent right is jointly owned, no joint owner may grant an exclusive license with regard to the patent right to any third party without the consent of all other joint owners. This rule works out to the advantage of a right owner with a vertically integrated organization because under this rule, such a right owner can secure freedom to make use of the patented invention while denying other joint owners the ability to grant an exclusive license to a third party. Conversely, if any of the joint owners wishes to let a third party utilize the patented invention under the concept of open innovation, there is a likelihood that the other joint owners will withhold their consent. (The likelihood would increase if the other joint owners have a vertically integrated organization.) Given the default rule set forth in Article 73, however, special arrangements can be made to restrict each of the joint owners from making use of the patented invention or to allow the freedom to grant an exclusive license to a third party. Considering the transaction costs involved in venturing to make such special arrangements, however, the default rule under Article 73 of the Patent Law has too significant an impact to be set aside. Under the transaction cost theory discussed earlier, obedience to the default rule under the Patent Law would reduce transaction costs, and therefore, it would have a decisive influence on the success or failure of future transactions, which would in turn influence thinking on what the default rule should be. In that sense, the existing law is advantageous to closed innovation over open innovation.
The purpose of the existing provision of Article 73 has been explained as follows: A patented invention is a physically unseizable entity and making use of a patented invention by any of the joint owners would not hinder the use of other joint owners. Therefore, each of the joint owners may freely make use of the patented invention in principle; at the same time, the infringement by any third party would have a significant economic impact on each of the joint owners who are making use of the patented invention, and therefore, it is necessary to prevent this from occurring without the knowledge of the joint owners. 44 82. This paper argues that a joint owner "s ability to make use of a patented invention can vary as a result of general succession or self-exploitation through their subcontractors and therefore that other joint owners" expectation of such ability may not be perfectly protectable. It goes on to suggest that Article 37 be reviewed in light of changes in industrial organization such as the progress of horizontal division of labor and a Japan-U.S. comparison thereof.
(iv) Patent Registration and Licensing with regard to Inventions Created at Universities Although not directly related to the issue under paragraph (1) of this Section, further reference should be made to patent registration and licensing with respect to inventions created at universities. This is prompted by the recent trend of universities pursuing patent registration and licensing with respect to inventions created through joint efforts by the government and others. On the surface this appears to be consistent with the concept of open innovation, but this has not always been the case.
As may be guessed by the fact that the purpose of open innovation is to utilize external knowledge, Chesbrough takes a positive view of the promotion of industry-university cooperation, but he takes a negative view of the pursuit by universities under the Bayh-Dole Act of patents with respect to inventions created as a result of such cooperation. Chesbrough says that kernels for next-generation technologies should be disseminated widely and rapidly and that the possibility exists that a university's pursuit of patents and licensing agreements with respect to the results of basic research may hinder the dissemination of useful knowledge. 46 In the real world, the evidence is beginning to support this concern. 47 Explaining the possible threats to the intellectual property system, he says that without proper management of the system universities can claim large amounts of compensation for alleged infringements with respect to their intellectual property, noting that in fact many universities are actually receiving patent royalties.
48
Following on the heels of the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S., both the government and individuals in Japan have been making efforts to introduce a scheme for technology transfer in which universities can obtain patent rights and grant exclusive licenses to external parties for their inventions. This scheme appears to be fraught with a variety of problems. So why does a software engineer take part in the development of open source software in full knowledge of the likelihood that the software she is creating will be subject to reproduction without constraint? One explanation frequently offered is that the software developer, driven by a desire for reputation, cares more about receiving credit as the creator of the software than she does about subsequent reproduction and/or modification of the software she created. 50 In addition, confirming the impact of a good reputation, some people attribute the motivation of software developers to a combination of "career incentive," or the desire to enhance future career opportunities (both in terms of employment and fund-raising) based on the strength of a good reputation, and "self-satisfaction incentive," in other words, seeking increased visibility in the organizational unit to which she belongs, with both incentives collectively referred to as a "signaling incentive." 51 Others have argued that as long as the individual tasks involved in software development are divided into small modules, the motivation of a single software developer does not matter. 52 According to this view, it is important to match tasks that require creativity and skill with individuals who possess those qualities.
However, it is the relevant individual himself who best knows his own skill, and when tasks are assigned by others within an organization there is an inevitable mismatch between the individual's capability and the skills required for the task.
In the marketplace, the concept of individual creativity is incompatible with the formulaic style of business transactions, and trying to specify requirements for the purpose of drawing up a contract involves difficulties and high costs. In an important contrast, open source software is written under a scheme in which a pool of software developers is created from a large network of individuals so that the most appropriate person for a job can voluntarily identify himself as a candidate to perform the task as divided into a small module. This scheme is known as the "peer production system."
As 3, which, with regard to the issue of flexibility of the patent system, indicates that the patent system has lost its uniformity in recent years, with emphasis on weighing on an individual basis, thereby raising an alert on this trend.
